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 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.1  Also 
before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply.2  The Court will grant 
Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply and will consider Defendant’s Surreply, as well 
as the arguments made by both parties with respect to that Motion.  Having considered the 
evidence and arguments presented by the parties, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction for the reasons set forth below.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
 Plaintiff Overstock.com is an online discount retailer that sells a variety of products in a 
range of categories.  Plaintiff also offers services, including car buying and pet adoption services.  
Plaintiff offers more than one million products and over six million different customers made 
purchases from Overstock.com in the last year.  “Overstock’s product offerings range from a 
                                                 
1 Docket No. 29. 
2 Docket No. 47. 
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$5.00 nail polish to a one-of-a-kind handmade Persian rug for hundreds of thousands of 
dollars.”3  
 Defendant owns and operates Nomorerack.com, which also provides a number of 
discounted consumer goods and directly competes with Plaintiff.  Defendant has 18.1 million 
members and, since its founding, has sold more than $420 million worth of products to nearly 
5.2 million customers. 
 Plaintiff owns numerous federally registered trademarks and service marks comprising 
the term Overstock.com.  Plaintiff uses and markets these marks in its advertising.  In some of its 
advertisements, Defendant uses the term “overstock.”  The precise use of that word by Defendant 
is discussed in more detail below.  Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendant from using its marks.  
II.  PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD 
 To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate: “(1) a likelihood 
of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that the movant will suffer irreparable harm in the 
absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in the movant’s favor; and (4) 
that the injunction is in the public interest.”4  “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary 
remedy; it is the exception rather than the rule.”5 
 “Three types of preliminary injunctions are specifically disfavored: (1) preliminary 
injunctions that alter the status quo; (2) mandatory preliminary injunctions; and (3) preliminary 
injunctions that afford the movant all the relief that it could recover at the conclusion of a full 
                                                 
3 Docket No. 29, at 11. 
4 RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009). 
5 GTE Corp. v. Williams, 731 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir. 1984). 
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trial on the merits.”6  “For these categories of disfavored preliminary injunctions, ‘the movant 
has a heightened burden of showing that the traditional four factors weigh heavily and 
compellingly in its favor before obtaining a preliminary injunction.’”7  Plaintiff admits that it 
seeks a disfavored injunction and therefore must meet this higher standard of proof.8 
III.  DISCUSSION 
 Prior to addressing the parties’ arguments, the Court notes that both parties have raised 
various evidentiary objections.  Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Motion is based, in part, on 
evidence that was not properly disclosed.  Plaintiff, in turn, argues that some of Defendant’s 
evidence should be disregarded because it is conclusory, lacks foundation, and is contrary to 
deposition testimony. 
 The Court need not specifically rule on these evidentiary objections.  The vast majority of 
the evidence objected to by both parties has limited relevance.  Further, to the extent that the 
Court has considered this evidence, it does not materially alter the Court’s analysis.  Therefore, 
the Court will proceed to the parties’ primary arguments. 
A. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS 
 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief under its Lanham Act claims for trademark infringement 
and unfair competition.9   
                                                 
6 Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Horne, 698 F.3d 1295, 1301 
(10th Cir. 2012). 
7 Id. (quoting Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp., 269 F.3d 1149, 1154 
(10th Cir. 2001)). 
8 Docket No. 39, at 26. 
9 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a). 
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 To prevail on its claim, Plaintiff must show: (1) that its mark is protectable, (2) that 
Defendant used the trademark “in connection with any goods or services,”10 and (3) that 
Defendant’s use “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, 
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another 
person.”11  The parties focus their arguments on the third factor and Defendant’s claim of fair 
use.  The Court will do the same. 
 “Whether proceeding under § 32 or § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, ‘the central inquiry is the 
same: whether the junior user’s mark is likely to cause confusion with the senior user’s mark.’”12  
The Tenth Circuit has identified six nonexhaustive factors to consider in determining whether 
there is a likelihood of confusion: 
(1) the degree of similarity between the competing marks; (2) the intent of the 
alleged infringer in adopting the contested mark; (3) evidence of actual confusion; 
(4) the similarity of the parties’ products and the manner in which the parties 
market them; (5) the degree of care that consumers are likely to exercise in 
purchasing the parties’ products; and (6) the strength of the contesting mark.13 
 “No one of the six factors is dispositive.”14  “The factors are interrelated, and the 
‘importance of any particular factor in a specific case can depend on a variety of circumstances, 
                                                 
10 Id. § 1125(a)(1). 
11 Id. § 1125(a)(1)(A). 
12 Hornady Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Doubletap, Inc., 746 F.3d 995, 1001 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting 




including the force of another factor.’”15  “At all times, however, the key inquiry is whether the 
consumer is likely to be deceived or confused by the similarity of the marks.”16 
 1. Degree of Similarity Between the Marks 
 “The degree of similarity between marks rests on sight, sound, and meaning.”17  The 
“court must determine whether the allegedly infringing mark will confuse the public when singly 
presented, rather than when presented side by side with the protected trademark.”18  “In 
comparing marks, ‘we do not independently examine each syllable of the marks but consider the 
mark as a whole as they are encountered by consumers in the marketplace.’  We therefore 
compare the full marks, not just their components.”19 
 Plaintiff argues that “the marks are virtually identical” because Defendant’s use of the 
word “overstock” is nearly the same as Plaintiff’s mark of “overstock.com.”20  According to 
Plaintiff, the important fact is that both Plaintiff and Defendant use the word “overstock.”  The 
Tenth Circuit, however, has rejected such a piecemeal approach.  In Water Pik, the Tenth Circuit 
compared the phrases “Sinu Cleanse” and “SinuSense,” not just the words “Cleanse” and 
“Sense.”21  Similarly, in Hornady, the Tenth Circuit evaluated the similarity of two marks—TAP 
and DoubleTap.  The plaintiff there argued “that the district court erred by not elevating the 
                                                 
15 Id. (quoting Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1143). 
16 Team Tires Plus, Ltd. v. Tires Plus, Inc., 394 F.3d 831, 833 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
17 Sally Beauty Co., Inc. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 972 (10th Cir. 2002). 
18 Id. 
19 Hornady Mfg., 746 F.3d at 1002 (quoting Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1155). 
20 Docket No. 29, at 32. 
21 Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1156. 
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marks’ one similarity—the word “tap”—above all differences.”22   The Tenth Circuit disagreed, 
stating that “the fact that both marks contain the syllable ‘tap’ does not control the similarity 
inquiry.”23  Thus, the fact that both parties use the word “overstock” is not determinative.  
Rather, the Court must consider the full marks.  In addition, the Court must consider the marks as 
they are encountered by consumers in the marketplace.  In making this comparison, the Court 
“must consider the effect of marketplace presentation, including ‘lettering styles, logos and 
coloring schemes.’”24   
 In this case, Plaintiff’s use of the word “overstock” is generally accompanied by its 
stylized “O” design, a white “O” on a red banner.  Plaintiff’s use of “overstock” is also 
accompanied by the “.com” suffix.   
 
 Defendant, on the other hand, does not use the stylized “O” design and does not use the 
“.com” suffix.  In addition, Defendant, unlike Plaintiff, does not use the word “overstock” alone.  
Rather, Defendant uses the word “overstock” in combination with other words, such as 
“overstock clearance.”  Further, Defendant’s use of the word “overstock” is generally in all caps, 
with no emphasis on the word “overstock.”  Finally, Defendant’s advertisements always include 
a reference to “nomorerack” or include Defendant’s web address: “Nomorerack.com.”  
                                                 
22 Hornady Mfg., 746 F.3d at 1001–02. 
23 Id. at 1002. 
24 Id. (quoting Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 22 F.3d 1527, 1531 (10th Cir. 1994). 
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 In its Reply, Plaintiff points out that the above-described differences are limited to 
display advertisements.  Plaintiff argues that text-based advertisements do not have these 
differences.  However, in text-based advertisements, the domain name of the advertiser is clearly 
displayed, further differentiating the advertisements. 
 Based upon these considerations, the Court finds that there is little visual similarity 
between the marks.  For substantially the same reasons, the Court finds that there is little aural 
similarity between the marks.  Plaintiff’s use includes the “.com” suffix, while Defendant’s use 
does not and instead always includes a second word.  Thus, using the example provided above, 
“Overstock.com” does not sound like “overstock clearance.” 
 Finally, the Court finds that there is similarity in the meaning of the marks.  The term 
“overstock” is used by both to represent the sale of discounted products.  However, Plaintiff uses 
the term to identify its company, while Defendant uses the term to identify a type of product or 
sale.  Yet even considering this similar meaning, there are sufficient differences between the two 






 2. Intent of the Alleged Infringer 
 “Proof that a defendant chose a mark with the intent of copying the plaintiff’s mark may, 
standing alone, justify an inference of likelihood of confusion.”25  “The proper focus under this 
factor is whether defendant had the intent to derive benefit from the reputation or good will of 
plaintiff.”26 
 Plaintiff argues that the Court can infer intent based on Defendant’s knowledge of 
Plaintiff.  However, the Tenth Circuit has recently rejected such reasoning.27  “When we have 
said that evidence of intent to copy may justify an inference of likelihood of confusion, we have 
been referring to copying a particular mark, not copying a competitor’s product.”28  Thus, the 
fact that Defendant may have been aware of Plaintiff is not enough to show intent on the part of 
Defendant.   
 Instead, there is evidence that Defendant used a number of different terms in their 
advertisements—such as Cyber Monday, Black Friday, Free Shipping, Blowout Sale—and 
settled on “overstock” because that word had the best performance.29  As explained by 
Defendant’s Executive Vice President and Chief Marketing Officer, “[t]he word overstock has 
the best performance in conjunction with a lot of other elements we use on our banners, which is 
                                                 
25 Sally Beauty Co., 304 F.3d at 973. 
26 Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
27 See Hornady Mfg., 746 F.3d at 1004 (“Whether DoubleTap’s founder was aware of Hornady 
and its products is irrelevant to whether DoubleTap adopted its mark intending to copy the TAP 
mark.”). 
28 Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1157. 
29 Docket No. 29 Ex. H, at 128:2–18.  
9 
why we continue to use it.”30  Based upon this, it appears that Defendant’s motivation in using 
the word “overstock” was not to copy Plaintiff’s mark, but rather because that term outperformed 
the other terms used by Defendant in marketing its products.  Whether the success of this term is 
based on Plaintiff’s reputation and good will or some other reason is not clear. 
 Plaintiff also argues that Defendant “has moved away from its own green and white color 
scheme and essentially adopted the red-and-white color scheme employed by Overstock.”31  In 
support of this argument, Plaintiff has provided evidence that Defendant used a red and white 
color scheme.  But there is also evidence that Defendant has used a green and white color 
scheme, a color scheme which matches Defendant’s logo.  Based on the record before it, the 
Court cannot find that Defendant has moved from one color scheme to another.  Rather, the 
evidence reflects that Defendant has used a variety of color schemes in its advertisements.  
Therefore, this evidence does not show intent.   
 Plaintiff further argues that intent can be inferred from Defendant’s use of “overstock” 
after Plaintiff sent Defendant cease and desist letters.  Again, this argument has been rejected by 
the Tenth Circuit.  As the court explained, “[u]nder the intent factor, the alleged infringer’s intent 
is measured at the time it ‘chose’ or ‘adopted’ its mark.  In analyzing intent, we look to evidence 
of ‘the process of choosing’ a mark, not evidence of events subsequent to its adoption.”32  Thus, 
the fact that Defendant has continued to use “overstock” after receiving cease and desist letters 
does not show intent.  Based on the above, the Court finds that this factor weighs against 
Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant. 
                                                 
30 Id. at 128:15–18. 
31 Docket No. 29, at 34. 
32 Hornady Mfg., 746 F.3d at 1004 (quoting Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1159). 
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 3. Evidence of Actual Confusion 
 “Although not necessary to prevail on a trademark infringement claim, evidence of actual 
confusion in the marketplace may be the best indication of likelihood of confusion.”33  However, 
“[w]e have consistently recognized . . . that isolated, anecdotal instances of actual confusion may 
be de minimis and may be disregarded in the confusion analysis.”34 
Evidence of the number of instances of actual confusion must be placed against 
the background of the number of opportunities for confusion before one can make 
an informed decision as to the weight to be given the evidence.  If there is a very 
large volume of contacts or transactions which could give rise to confusion and 
there is only a handful of instances of actual confusion, the evidence of actual 
confusion may receive relatively little weight.35 
 Plaintiff has received ten consumer complaints concerning Defendant and has provided 
over 200 complaints that have been produced by Defendant.  These complaints show that some 
consumers who placed an order with Defendant thought that they were placing an order with 
Plaintiff, others thought that Defendant had somehow “hijacked” their order, other consumers 
believed that Defendant’s ad was an ad for Plaintiff, and yet others believed that the parties were 
somehow affiliated.  Plaintiff contends that these instances of actual confusion are sufficient to 
overcome the de minimis threshold.  However, a close examination of Plaintiff’s examples of 
                                                 
33 Sally Beauty Co., Inc., 304 F.3d at 974. 
34 Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1150 (stating that four instances of actual confusion constituted de 
minimis evidence); see also Hornady Mfg., 746 F.3d at 1005 (finding “that a handful of instances 
[of actual confusion] over ten years” to be de minimis); King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. 
Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1092–93 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that seven instances of actual 
confusion was de minimis); Universal Money Ctrs., 22 F.3d at 1535 (disregarding evidence that 
plaintiff’s employees had received a number of accounts of customer confusion). 
35 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:14 (4th ed. 
2014). 
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actual confusion belies Plaintiff’s contention and, as stated, the examples of actual confusion 
must be put in the proper context. 
 To be sure, Plaintiff has provided evidence of actual confusion.  However, there is also 
evidence from among those cited to the Court where consumers clearly recognized the 
distinction between Plaintiff and Defendant.  For example, one consumer noted that “[s]ome 
items listed on Nomorerack.com are cheaper than the same items that Overstock.com has” and 
that they found “better pricing on nomorerack.com.”36  Thus, not all of Plaintiff’s evidence of 
actual confusion actually shows any confusion on the part of the consumer. 
 Even considering the evidence of actual confusion, it must be put in proper context.  Both 
parties tout that they have millions of customers and make millions of sales per year.  Thus, 
relative to the total volume of sales, the limited evidence of actual confusion provides little 
weight.   
 Plaintiff argues that “the denominators used by Nomorerack in its calculations are 
meaningless because, inter alia, there is no evidence of the numbers of consumers who actually 
saw and could have been confused by Nomorerack’s infringing advertisements.”37  At oral 
argument, Plaintiff emphasized that this evidence is not intended to provide a clear picture of the 
instances of actual confusion.   
 This argument, however, cuts against Plaintiff.  Plaintiff bears the burden of proof on this 
matter.  Plaintiff has not engaged in any meaningful analysis concerning the evidence of actual 
confusion.  At most, Plaintiff has provided a handful of complaints evidencing confusion.  The 
                                                 
36 Docket No. 29 Ex. M. 
37 Docket No. 41, at 23. 
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Tenth Circuit has stated “that isolated, anecdotal instances of actual confusion may be de 
minimis and may be disregarded in the confusion analysis.”38  Because Plaintiff has only 
provided a limited number of instances of actual confusion, the Court finds that this factor 
weighs against Plaintiff. 
 4. Relation in Use and the Manner of Marketing 
 “The greater the similarity between the products and services, the greater the likelihood 
of confusion.”39  The Court is to consider “(1) the similarity of the products and (2) the similarity 
in the manner of marketing the products.”40 
 Both parties sell a wide variety of products.  Though Plaintiff provides a more diverse 
range of products and services, the parties sell a number of similar products and they are direct 
competitors in those areas.  In addition, both parties sell their products in the same way.  They 
also market and advertise their products in largely the same way.  Therefore, the Court finds that 
this factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff. 
 5. Degree of Care 
 “A consumer exercising a high degree of care in selecting a product reduces the 
likelihood of confusion.”41  “[B]uyers typically exercise little care in the selection of inexpensive 
items that may be purchased on impulse.”42  “Accordingly, items purchased on impulse are more 
                                                 
38 Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1150. 
39 Sally Beauty Co., Inc., 304 F.3d at 974 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 975. 
42 Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 926 (10th Cir. 1986) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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likely to be confused than expensive items, which are typically chosen carefully.”43  However, 
the Tenth Circuit does not take a “price-determinative approach.”44  Rather, “[t]he relevant 
inquiry focuses on the consumer’s degree of care exercised at the time of purchase.”45 
 Plaintiff argues that both parties offer a range of relatively inexpensive items, which may 
result in consumers exercising little care.  Plaintiff further argues that Defendant offers short-
term sales, which increases the likelihood of customer confusion “because consumers will be 
acting quickly to take advantage of the deal that is offered, without taking the time to carefully 
examine the source of the offer.”46 
 While it is true that both parties offer inexpensive items, Plaintiff also offers a number of 
expensive items.  Plaintiff has stated that “Overstock’s product offerings range from a $5.00 nail 
polish to a one-of-a-kind handmade Persian rug for hundreds of thousands of dollars.”47  Further, 
Plaintiff’s Vice President of Marketing has stated that a high percentage of Plaintiff’s customers 
engage in comparison shopping.48  Indeed, Plaintiff prices it products “assuming people are 
comparison shopping” and for this reason, Plaintiff seeks to “price lower than [its] 
competitors.”49 
 Both parties offer a wide variety of products.  While some of those products may be 
inexpensive items purchased on impulse, a number of those items do not fall into this category.  
                                                 
43 Sally Beauty Co., Inc., 304 F.3d at 975. 
44 Hornady Mfg., 746 F.3d at 1006. 
45 Sally Beauty Co., Inc., 304 F.3d at 975. 
46 Docket No. 29, at 39. 
47 Id. at 11. 
48 Docket No. 34 Ex. D, at 25:2–26:11. 
49 Id. at 26:12–20. 
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Further, the relative expense of the product is not the relevant inquiry, but instead the degree of 
care exercised by the consumer.  Because both parties purport to offer items at discounted prices, 
the Court believes that consumers will exercise care to find the best price for the product they 
seek to purchase, rather than purchasing the item on impulse.  Therefore, the Court finds that this 
factor weighs in favor of Defendant. 
 6. Strength or Weakness of the Mark 
  “The stronger the mark, the greater the likelihood that encroachment on the mark will 
cause confusion.”50  “Strength consists of both conceptual strength, which refers to the 
placement of the mark along the distinctiveness spectrum, and commercial strength, which refers 
to the marketplace recognition value of the mark.”51 
  a. Conceptual Strength 
  “Conceptual strength is measured on a spectrum of distinctiveness ranging along the 
following five categories (from least to most distinctive): (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) 
suggestive, (4) arbitrary, and (5) fanciful.”52   
A mark is generic if it is a common description of products and refers to the genus 
of which the particular product is a species.  A mark is descriptive if it describes 
the product’s features, qualities, or ingredients in ordinary language or describes 
the use to which the product is put.  A mark is suggestive if it merely suggests the 
features of the product, requiring the purchaser to use imagination, thought, and 
perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods.  An arbitrary mark 
applies a common word in an unfamiliar way.  A fanciful mark is not a real word 
at all, but is invented for its use as a mark.53 
                                                 
50 Sally Beauty Co., Inc., 304 F.3d at 975. 
51 Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1056 
(10th Cir. 2008). 
52 Hornady Mfg., 746 F.3d at 1007. 
53 Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc., 192 F.3d 337, 344 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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“Only suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks are considered strong in and of themselves.”54 
 Plaintiff argues that its marks are conceptually strong because it has an incontestable 
federally registered mark in OVERSTOCK.COM.  However, the Tenth Circuit has noted that 
“‘[t]he fact that a trademark is the subject of a federal registration that has ripened into 
incontestable status should not dictate the conclusion that the mark is strong with no further 
analysis.’”55  Thus, whether Plaintiff’s trademark is incontestable does not end the Court’s 
analysis.  The Court must go on to determine whether Plaintiff’s marks are strong using the 
factors set forth above. 
 The parties dispute whether Plaintiff’s marks are descriptive or suggestive.   
The determination whether a mark is descriptive or suggestive is difficult, and we 
have endorsed a helpful test for distinguishing between the two categories: 
suggestive terms “require the buyer to use thought, imagination, or perception to 
connect the mark with the goods,” whereas descriptive terms “directly convey to 
the buyer the ingredients, qualities, or characteristics of the product.”56   
“The determination is often based on intuitive reactions rather than analytical reasoning.”57  
 Though a close question, it appears that Plaintiff’s marks fall on the side of descriptive.  
Plaintiff’s use of the word “overstock” conveys the characteristics of its products, specifically 
that the goods it sells are excess or surplus inventory.  The use of “overstock” in this manner is 
consistent with Plaintiff’s founding.  Plaintiff has explained that “Overstock originally began as 
an Internet-based liquidator of excess or surplus inventory.”58 
                                                 
54 Hornady Mfg., 746 F.3d at 1007. 
55 Vail Assoc., Inc. v. Vend-Tel-Co., Ltd., 516 F.3d 853, 867 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting 2 
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 11:82). 
56 Hornady Mfg., 746 F.3d at 1007 (quoting Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1152–53). 
57 Educ. Dev. Corp. v. Econ. Co., 562 F.2d 26, 29 (10th Cir. 1977). 
58 Docket No. 29, at 4. 
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 Plaintiff argues that its marks are not merely descriptive because consumers must use 
thought and imagination to connect the marks to the goods and services offered by Plaintiff and 
that the marks do not convey the variety of services now offered by Plaintiff.  However, for a 
mark to be descriptive, it “need not directly convey all of a product’s characteristics, uses, or 
functions but need only impart directly a crucial, important aspect of the product.”59  In this 
instance, the use of “overstock” conveys that the products sold are excess or surplus inventory. 
  b. Commercial Strength 
 “Commercial strength is ‘the marketplace recognition value of the mark.’”60  
“Commercial strength is a concept analogous to secondary meaning.”61  The Tenth Circuit has  
identified several factors as helpful in evaluating secondary meaning, including 
direct evidence of recognition by consumers and circumstantial evidence 
regarding: (1) the length and manner of the mark’s use, (2) the nature and extent 
of advertising and promotion of the mark, and (3) the efforts made to promote a 
conscious connection, in the public’s mind, between the mark and a particular 
product.62 
 Plaintiff has presented evidence to support a finding that its mark is commercially strong.  
There is evidence showing that consumers associate the mark “overstock.com” and the word 
“overstock” with Plaintiff.  For example, a study commissioned by Plaintiff shows that 
approximately 73% of United States consumers and 89% of online shoppers had heard of 
Overstock.com or “the Big ‘O.’”63  Additionally, Plaintiff has presented evidence of the nature 
and extent of its advertising efforts to promote the mark, and their efforts to connect the mark to 
                                                 
59 Educ. Dev. Corp., 562 F.2d at 29. 
60 Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1153 (quoting King of the Mountain, 185 F.3d at 1093). 
61 Id. 
62 Hornady Mfg., 746 F.3d at 1008. 
63 Docket No. 41 Ex. B-3. 
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its company.  Based upon this evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s mark is commercially 
strong. 
 “Evidence of a mark’s commercial strength can make up for conceptual weakness 
because a conceptually weak mark may become strong by virtue of acquired consumer 
awareness.”64  Because of the mark’s commercial strength, the Court finds that this factor weighs 
in Plaintiff’s favor.  
 7. Conclusion on Likelihood of Confusion 
 As set forth above, two factors—strength of the mark and similarity of products and 
marketing—favor Plaintiff.  The remaining factors favor Defendant.   While “[t]he tilt of the 
scales does not determine the issue,”65 those factors favoring Defendant demonstrate that 
consumers are not likely to be confused by Defendant’s use of the word “overstock.”  In 
addition, Plaintiff carries a difficult burden and must show that this factor, along with all of the 
others, weighs heavily and compellingly in its favor.  The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to 
meet that burden.  Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. 
 8. Fair Use 
 In addition to arguing that Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of confusion, Defendant 
argues that its use of the word “overstock” constitutes fair use.  “The ‘fair use’ defense permits 
the use of a name or term, other than as a trademark, that is descriptive and is used fairly and in 
good faith only to describe the goods.”66  Fair use is an affirmative defense “as it allows a 
defendant to avoid liability even where the plaintiff has proved likelihood of confusion and the 
                                                 
64 Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1153. 
65 Hornady Mfg., 746 F.3d at 1008. 
66 Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 937 (10th Cir. 1983). 
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other elements of a prima facie case of infringement.”67  To prove the affirmative defense of fair 
use, Defendant must establish: (1) Defendant is not using the term “overstock” as a trademark or 
service mark, (2) “overstock” is descriptive of the goods or services of Defendant, and (3) that 
such descriptive use is fair and made in good faith.68 
 Though the Court need not determine this issue for the purposes of resolving this Motion, 
the Court notes that Defendant has presented compelling evidence that its use of the term 
“overstock” constitutes fair use.  Specifically, Defendant has presented evidence that it is not 
using the term “overstock” as a trademark or service mark, that the term “overstock” is 
descriptive of the goods sold by Defendant, and that Defendant’s use is fair and made in good 
faith.  Therefore, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief for this additional 
reason. 
B. REMAINING FACTORS 
 Plaintiff argues that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued because 
it is suffering damage to its reputation based upon consumer confusion.  However, as discussed 
above, the instances of actual confusion are minimal, especially considering the large volume of 
sales made by the parties.  Plaintiff also argues that it is suffering harm because it has lost 
customers to Defendant.  However, there is scant evidence that Plaintiff has lost customers due 
to confusion.  There are a variety of other factors, such as cost and product selection, which 
could explain the decision of a consumer to purchase from Defendant rather than Plaintiff.  Thus, 
the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden on this factor. 
                                                 
67 Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1240 
(D. Colo. 2009). 
68 Coherent, Inc. v. Coherent Tech., Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1055, 1061 (D. Colo. 1990). 
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 On the other hand, Defendant has shown that it will suffer harm if the injunction is 
granted.  The Court finds persuasive Defendant’s argument that granting the injunction will 
require it to stop using one of its most effective advertising campaigns, thereby resulting in harm.  
Therefore, the Court finds that this factor weighs against granting an injunction. 
 Finally, because Plaintiff cannot prevail on the remaining factors, it has failed to show 
that the proposed injunction is in the public interest.  Therefore, the Court finds that this factor 
also weighs against granting the injunction. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 It is therefore 
 ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. 29) is 
DENIED.  It is further 
 ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply (Docket No. 47) is 
GRANTED. 
 DATED this 30th day of June, 2014. 
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